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The debate over "big society" in Britain
British Prime Minister David Cameron took office in May 2010 with the slogan "big society."
A draft plan for his "big society" was revealed in a speech he gave in November 2009 as
opposition leader1, and some of the ideas moving toward realization were announced in July
2010 after he became Prime Minister. According to that announcement, the plan will attach
importance to the activities of voluntary community organizations as instruments for provision
of various kinds of social services. In order to facilitate fund-raising for these organizations, the
plan would set up a "Big Society Bank," using funds from dormant accounts of banks and
building societies. Using this bank, it would have social entrepreneurs, primarily local people,
buy up entities such as post offices and pubs whose survival is in danger, as well as parks,
museums, and various welfare facilities, and operate them as facilities run by local people.
Because these would not be commercial enterprises, the people would run them by utilizing
things like interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity, along with a volunteer spirit. The idea
is that this would spur people in the community to become more active, improving social
relations and allowing them to reverse the decline of their community.2 It seems that the "big
society" that Cameron speaks of may also be called the "rebuilding of social capital" in
communities.
Meanwhile, the opposition Labour Party and the central to left leaning media are sceptical
about the plan. At the roots of this scepticism there is a thought that the idea might be paired
with large-scale spending cuts by the government. The Cameron coalition government has made
clear its stance to push forward on reducing the government's budget deficit. It is likely
unavoidable that large-scale cuts in annual expenditures will squeeze the provision of social
services. There is apprehension that the "big society" idea is probably something that will shrink
the government's welfare state functions in order to achieve "cheap government," redirecting
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people’s attention to the necessity of self-help in the communities.3 Ed Miliband, leader of the
Labour Party, has described the "big society" as "a cloak for the small state", and insisted that
‘our economy, our communities and our civic society’ can be made stronger ‘not by small
government, not by "big government" but by a government which values and acts in partnership
with them.’4
In response to these criticisms, Prime Minister Cameron is denying on the surface that
his "big society" idea is a cover-up for welfare related budget cuts. But even so, critics suspect
that the two are flip sides of the same coin, as Cameron is positioning his "big society" as an
opposing concept to "big government." He underscores the deficiencies of bureaucracy under a
Labour Party-style "big government." He also sees people's dependence on the welfare state as
a problem. In the field of social security, he says the government's excess provision is crowding
out private sector efforts, implying that "big government" is a major factor obstructing a healthy
society. Therefore, his assertion is essentially that in order to revitalize "society," it is important
for communities to act independently from the state and for local people to work together in a
coordinated, mutual fashion. It was former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who once
remarked, ‘There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there
are families,’ as she tried to encourage self-help efforts at the individual and household level.
Cameron's assertion, by adding "society" to the picture, appears to differ from Thatcher's
assertion. However, with respect to favouring "small government," Mr Cameron can clearly be
considered a successor to Mrs Thatcher. Although the unit has shifted from individuals and
households to communities, the desire to promote self-help is common to them both.
What this paper purports to do is somewhat of a research survey based on a limited point
of view. The issue I would like to consider, in reference to social capital studies, is that Prime
Minister Cameron is postulating "big society" as an opposing concept to "big government."
Cameron’s way of understanding sounds like insisting essentially that "big government"
obstructs the formation of social capital, or that how large social capital is correlates with how
small the government is. But such a finding has not been established in empirical researches on
social capital. Here, while alluding mostly to the history of British social policy, I look at several
studies discussing social capital and do a survey of them, taking note of how "government" is
positioned in them.
Income inequality and people's health
In the November 2009 speech where Mr Cameron first revealed his "big society" idea, he cited
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett's book The Spirit Level 5 when mentioning how big an
influence economic inequality has on such things as a society's average longevity, crime rate,
3  A. McSmith, ‘Cameron’s Big Society attacked as a cover for spending cuts’, The Independent, July 20, 2010;
A. Coote, ‘Cameron’s ‘big society’ will leave the poor and powerless behind’, Guardian, July 19, 2010.
4  E. Miliband, ‘The Big Society: a cloak for the small state’, The Independent, February 13, 2011
5  Wilkinson and K. Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do better (2009).
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and education level, and he indicated that making society more equal is what the "big society"
idea aims to do. Then Cameron looked back over history to find the causes of Britain's present
unequal society. Since the nineteenth century, social policies were enforced to cope with the
problem of poverty, such as the poor laws, the factory acts, social insurance, and public housing,
and after going through the economic slump during the interwar period, they turned into the
post-war welfare state system. While he praises the role that this welfare state played in the
equalization of society at least during the initial stages, he says that since the late-1960s in
particular, the welfare state's inefficiency and the obstruction of local communities' independent
efforts by the centralized bureaucracy have become evident. He adds that the disparity reduction
measures taken under the Labour governments after 1997 had only meager effects because of
that centralized bureaucratic control. So essentially he says that the government is what is
obstructing the resolution of inequality, and a transfer of power from the central government to
the communities ("community empowerment") is actually the most important policy task at
hand.
An objection was presented by Wilkinson and Pickett, whose book Cameron had quoted.
As it turns out, in the historical review about the causes of inequality that Cameron gave in his
speech, there is a blank from the late1960s to 1997. Indeed it was during this period that Britain
shifted course toward a "small government." The Thatcher Conservative government (1979-90)
orchestrated the penetration of neo-liberal economic doctrines. According to Wilkinson and
Pickett, the implementation, starting with the Thatcher government, of policies that placed too
much faith in market competition was a deciding factor in increasing the disparity between the
affluent and the poor.6
Wilkinson has been active in making remarks about the relationship between inequality
and social problems, in particular the impact that income inequality has on people's health
conditions.7 To summarize his argument in simple terms, he says that inequality makes people
unhealthy, but he sees social capital as an intervening factor in the relationship between
inequality and people's health. He says economic disparity hinders the development of
reciprocal, cooperative relations based on trust between people in a society – in other words,
the formation of social capital – and the state of cold, unsociable societies with a lot of stress
has a negative influence on the health of not only the poor but the affluent as well.8 Wilkinson
invokes studies of health indicators and social capital, such as the work of social epidemiologist
6  R. Wilkinson and K. Pickett, ‘A broken society, yes. But broken by Thatcher,’ Guardian, January 29, 2010.
7  R. Wilkinson, The Impact of Inequality: How to make sick societies healthier (2005).
8  Wilkinson tends to place a particular emphasis on the influence that disparity has on people's psyche and
the influence that this psyche has on poor health. He thus views not only absolute poverty but also relative
poverty as a major problem. However, he is criticized by other researchers who, while agreeing with him on
the aspect of pointing to the negative influence that economic disparity has on health, say he makes light of the
aspect that material poverty has influences on poor health. For example, J. Lynch, G. Davey Smith, G. Kaplan,
and J. House, ‘Income inequality and mortality: importance to health of individual income, psychosocial
environment, or material conditions,’British Medical Journal, 320 (2000), pp.1200-1204.
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Ichiro Kawachi9 and others, as well as Robert Putnam's argument,10 in pointing out that social
capital is important for health.
But if we compare Putnam and Wilkinson's arguments, the way they place their main
emphasis in their conclusions differs slightly. Putnam thinks of the cause and effect relationship
between inequality, social capital, and health primarily in terms of social capital, and as a
strategic implication of that, he emphasizes community rebuilding through the promotion of
civic involvement. On the other hand, Wilkinson, whose argument focuses mostly on the
inequality problem, places his main emphasis on the importance of income redistribution. In
order to achieve equality, one method is to reduce the difference in pre-tax income (for example,
reduce salary disparity between employees in companies, or enhance welfare benefits in
companies) like Japan once did. Another method is for the government to redistribute income
by way of taxation and social insurance and public provision. He argues that essentially a
combination of both types is necessary. How to combine them should be decided according to
circumstances, but what is of prime importance is having political resolve for redistribution to
tackle the inequality problem.11
Wilkinson and Pickett say that politicians who readily deplore the collapse of family and
community without dealing with the problem of inequality are ‘unscientific’. In light of that, if
Prime Minister Cameron is considering resolving the disparity, they suggest that government
redistribution policies are important. They believe that only with such policies will a community
based on trust and cooperation recover and people's welfare improve. Wilkinson and Pickett
commend, with certain conditions, the fact that Gordon Brown’s Labour government
incorporated some sort of policy into every year's budget that redistributed wealth in order to
do away with "social exclusion."12 But because earnings by those in the highest income bracket
soared, they say the Labour government ultimately ended without having done enough. So unlike
Cameron, Wilkinson and Pickett do not view the government's redistributive welfare policies
as impediments to civil society.13
With regard to the argument that views the enhancement of "big government" as a cause
of declining civic involvement and participation, Putnam is also dismissive. While there are
some individual policies that impede community activity, no general correlation is seen in US
states between a gap in social capital and indicators of things like welfare expenditures or
government size. Furthermore, in a comparison of European countries, social capital indicators
9  I. Kawachi and B.P. Kennedy, The Health of Nations: why inequality is harmful to your health (2002)
10 R.D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000), Chapter 20 in
particular (Health and Happiness)
11 Wilkinson & Pickett, The Spirit Level
12 For an assessment of the 13 years under New Labour, see P. Toynbee and D. Walker, The Verdict. Did Labour
Change Britain? (2010); P. Thane, ‘The balance sheet on Labour's 13 years: so much good, such an opportunity
lost - Toynbee and Walker reviewed’, Open Democracy (online), 15 November 2010.
13 Wilkinson and Pickett, ‘A broken society.’
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are the largest in the northern European countries, where welfare expenditures are massive.14
Stephen Kunitz, epidemiological historian at Rochester University, calls attention to the fact
that high inequality, low social capital, and high mortality rates are recorded in southern US
states, where state government redistribution functions are weak and public medical provision
is inadequate. And yet Kunitz himself is somewhat sceptical of the view that social capital in
general always contributes to an improvement in people's health, and if anything, he attaches
more weight to upgrading the public medical system.15
Linking social capital
In his speech, Prime Minister Cameron cited the name of Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009
Nobel Prize for Economics, and said that the activities of the non-state sector are more effective
than those of the state for resolving community problems.16 But while the non-state sector
Ostrom refers to is also a non-market sector, Cameron tends to perceive the state and society as
a dichotomy, so the relationship between society and the market sector is not clear. The main
purpose of Ostrom's work in the first place is to try to overcome the traditional state-market
dichotomy in economics with respect to the issue of conserving and maintaining the "commons",
and she says that there is a third method of resolution besides the state and the market – namely
self-governance by interested parties and stakeholders in the community.17 Rather than asserting
that this third method is versatile in any kind of policy area, Ostrom perceives the three as being
more mutually complementary than substitutional.18
What is difficult when we think of local governance is the positioning of existing local
governments. When Cameron says "big government," he seems to refer mostly to the central
government or a centralized bureaucracy; on the other hand, what he mentions as the instruments
for "big society" are not local governments but rather voluntary community bodies such as
charities and social enterprises. Does this mean he intends to view local governments as part of
the governmental sector and bypass them (i.e., to see them as a target for reduction because they
are part of "big government," or because they are a local agency of the centralized state)? Local
governments are intrinsically meant to be a representative arm of local residents, and in that
sense local governments can also be seen as one type of community organization. In England,
there have not traditionally been mayors directly elected by the residents, and the oneness with
14 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.281
15 S.J. Kunitz, The Health of Populations: General theories and particular realities (2007), pp.121-122.
Contending that if church membership is excluded, the degree of citizen participation in the US is not necessarily
higher than that of Western Europe, Kunitz is wary of looking at the correlation between health indicators and
the social capital indicators that Putnam employs. That is also in part due to the fact that even since the 1960s,
which is when Putnam thought the decline of American community began, the average life span has extended.
16 Cameron, ‘The Big Society’
17 E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action (1990).
18 E. Ostrom, ‘Covenanting, Co-Producing, and the Good Society’, The Newsletter of PEGS, 3(2), Summer
1993, pp. 7-9
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local councils and local government officials has always been stronger than Japan, for example.19
In recent years, there are changes being made to local government systems (for example,
widening them through the mergers of basic local governments, or emphasizing "leadership"
through the introduction in some places of direct elections for mayorship), but it is not yet clear
in the "big society" idea what will be done about these. If "government" and "society" are
perceived only as opposing concepts, it became difficult to place the local councils.
How to perceive "government", especially local government, is a point of contention also
in the social capital debate. Cambridge historian Simon Szreter, who specializes in population
and health issues, has pointed out that Putnam's historical account of social capital in the modern
US lacks sufficient mention of the role of government. In his Bowling Alone, Putnam tried to
extract a lesson from the fact that in the time from the Gilded Age (from after the Civil War to
around 1900) to the Progressive Era (1900 to WWI), various kinds of voluntary organizations
increased rapidly and grew. He says that in the Gilded Age, organizations concerned with the
welfare of members in their group were the mainstream, but in the Progressive Era, interest
gradually expanded to reach outside of groups’ membership, and organizations striving toward
the welfare of the community as a whole increased. That is to say, there was a shift in relative
weight from inward-looking "bonding" social capital to outward-looking "bridging" social
capital.20 Szreter says we should turn our attention to the fact that most of the organizations
striving for the social reform of the community in the Progressive Era pressed the government
and strove to control unscrupulous businesses and enhance the provision of public services. In
some cases, these social movements at first led local governments to act, and then their success
at the local level led the federal government to act as well, leading to national reform. Many
historians point to the problems of social reform in this era on the moral and disciplinary
interventionist side, but at any rate, reforms (e.g., public health reforms) did advance as voluntary
movements of citizens got governments involved. Szreter stresses that these community
organizations and local governments, as well as their relationships with state and federal
governments, should also be included in the concept of social capital. He says that good
relationships that encompass not only individuals and voluntary organizations but also
governmental bodies can be seen as an asset for a society.21
What Szreter employs, therefore, is the concept of "linking" social capital that was first
introduced by Michael Woolcock. Szreter commends that Putnam took into account the problems
with "bonding" social capital and began to mention the importance of "bridging" capital.
However, while "bridging" is an appropriate metaphor to describe horizontal relations, or
19 With regard to the situation in London, see T. Belton and P.J. Corfield, ‘Building social capital through
community politics in an inner London borough: the Labour Party in Battersea, 1908-2008’, The Senshu Social
Capital Review, no.1 (2010), pp. 37-65.
20 Putnam, Bowling Alone, Chapter 23.
21 S. Szreter, ‘The state of social capital: bringing back in power, politics, and history’, Theory and Society, 31
(2002), pp. 573-621.
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relations between parties on a near-equal footing in terms of power, it is inadequate for
describing vertical relations, or social capital that is formed between parties with differing
abilities to access authority and resources, such as government agencies and ordinary citizens.
With that in mind, when including the government sector in the social capital debate, he is
proposing the use of the "linking" concept as something that includes vertical social relations.
In 2004, Szreter and Woolcock wrote a joint essay for the International Journal of Epidemiology
arguing for the utility of this concept in understanding the network structure between government
and the society and their synergistic effects on public health policy.22
Government and society in history
Prime Minister Cameron's "big society" idea touts mutual assistance and volunteer activities
for the resolution of social problems, whereas historian Lorie Charlesworth points out that in
order for a "big society" relying on mutuality and volunteering, it is important for the government
to provide a proper legal and financial framework. What Charlesworth has in mind for that is
what is known as the old Poor Law, in effect until its revision in 1834. Under the old Poor Law,
people had the right to receive relief in times of adversity, and each community (parish) was
obliged to assist its poor. The law institutionalized a form of redistribution by way of a "poor
rate" levied on property owners. An attempt to restrict this custom and culture of assistance,
embedded in English society over many years, on the grounds of the priority of economic
growth, came with the new Poor Law after 1834. Thereafter, according to Charlesworth, debates
over social welfare spending have often inherited the ideas of this new Poor Law (the idea of
‘deterred’ provision with a variety of conditions attached). Charlesworth's argument is that if
Cameron wants a true "big society," he needs to revisit the tradition of not the new Poor Law
but the old Poor Law.23
In recent years, reassessment of what the welfare society was like before the nineteenth
century is becoming a trend in British history. But there are differing views between historians
on the degree to which the advantages that Charlesworth stresses in the old Poor Law actually
worked. There was a substantial gap in actual operations among communities, and there were
probably some places where the law did not necessarily contribute to resolving social
problems.24 There are also some historians who put much weight on not only the assistance
22 S. Szreter and M. Woolcock, ‘Health by association? Social capital, social theory, and the political economy
of public health’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 33 (2004), pp. 650-667. The same volume features
comments from social capitalists such as R. Putnam and I. Kawachi and critics such as V. Navaro and J. Lynch,
and one can see a broadening of the points of controversy regarding health policy and the social capital debate.
The same essay was contained in Chapter 11 of Szreter's solo work published the following year: S. Szreter,
Health and Wealth: Studies in history and policy (2005).
23 L. Charlesworth, ‘England's early 'Big Society': parish welfare under the Old Poor Law’, History and Policy
Papers (online), November 2010.
24 S. King, Poverty and Welfare in England, 1700-1850: a regional perspective (2000).
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provided by the Poor Law but the role of voluntary agencies.25 In any case, there were
differences in what things were like, depending on the time and place, and we should not idealize
the old Poor Law too much. But many are now casting doubt on a simplistic "Whiggish view
of history" – which assumes that social policies have always ‘progressed’.
Szreter is another of the historians who commend the social security system in the age of
old Poor Law. In his view, Britain’s social security system at that time served as a form of
underlying support for its industrial revolution.26 However, in addition to the drastic social
changes brought about by the industrial revolution, such as the concentration of the population
in large cities, there was a shift in policy toward the "cheap government" symbolized by the
new Poor Law. This brought on deterioration in living conditions for many people, and during
the golden age of British economic development from the 1830s to the 1860s, the rise of average
life expectancy ended up stagnating (and even worsening, in large cities) as a result. Even in
the mid-nineteenth century when average life span stagnated despite economic growth, charities
such as voluntary hospitals and mutual aid organizations such as friendly societies existed, but
most of them were inward-looking organizations designed to secure limited benefits within their
membership. Many of lower working classes were excluded from these security systems.
According to Szreter, this means that the mid-nineteenth century did feature the formation of
bonding social capital, but it lacked bridging and linking social capital.27
Public health policy for the improvement of sanitary conditions had already been explored
in the 1840s at the initiative of the central government, but there was a strong backlash at the
local level against centralized intervention, so these explorations did not link to implementation
right away. It was after the 1870s that sanitary reform began to materialize at the local level.
One of the triggers for this change, according to Szreter, was the extension of suffrage to part
of working classes, and local councillors became oblige to pay more attention to resolving the
problems of the community as a whole than to protecting vested interests. Also, professionals
who had the expertise for putting this shift into policy form and giving it shape (e.g., in the
public health field, the medical officers health) were assigned to the local authorities. There was
also the emergence of local politicians who served as pioneers of social reform led by local
government, like Birmingham mayor Joseph Chamberlain who utilized social networks in local
community well and, under the slogan of "civic gospel," exercised leadership in coordinating
interests and views within the community and mobilizing collective activities. The reform led
by Chamberlain in Birmingham is famous as "gas and water socialism," as he moved forward
on building the infrastructure for gas, water, and sewage, as well as public housing for workers.
His reforms even served as a model for other cities both in Britain and abroad (e.g. Osaka under
the leadership of Mayor Hajime Seki). The central government, drawing on these pioneering
25 M.J. Daunton (ed.), Charity, Self-interest and Welfare in the English Past (1996).
26 Szreter, Health and Wealth, p. 425.
27 Ibid., p.399.
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examples at the local level, proceeded with national legislation and set up public loan systems,
essentially playing a promotional role in the public health reform led by the local authorities.
Considering that there was cooperation between public authorities, voluntary agencies and
citizens, with local councils acting as a core, Szreter sees this as an example of linking social
capital formation.28 Partly because of the public health reform that proceeded on the basis of
this linking social capital, he says Britain's average life expectancy began to rise again. In the
debate about the decline of mortality in the modern age, Szreter is one of the leading scholars
who emphasize the importance of not only the improvement in nutrition standards that comes
along with economic growth but also various social interventions such as health reform.29
A major focal point of research in recent years about the history of the British welfare
state is that its basis was not only the "state" but a "mixed economy of welfare," so to speak,
that includes services provided not only by the statutory sector but also by various voluntary
agencies at the community level.30 What Szreter's argument did was to nail down the essence
of research trends relating to this "mixed economy of welfare" and organize it well using the
term social capital. Of course, this was a bold way of epitomizing things, so there are sure to be
criticisms from other historians. For example, one such criticism could be that his view of
Chamberlain's achievements is quite rosy. But in my view, apart from whether or not this is
referred to as a shift from bonding to linking social capital, it is true that there were moves to
coordination and integration of various voluntary and statutory services under the initiative of
the local councils, in order to establish more efficient and effective systems for provision of
social services. Such a policy trend became conspicuous after the late nineteenth century. Why
the local councils were considered qualified to be the integrating bodies for such services was
that, for one, they had specialized experts such as medical officers of health; but more than
anything, it was because the local councils are elective bodies representing local residents and
could thus decide the appropriate forms of public provision on the basis of local consensus.31
Attempts to create local government-led systems for supplying social services in the early
twentieth century, however, did not lead to a fundamental resolution of regional disparities. In
the 1930s a gap arose in people's standards of living, health standards, and social service
provision between areas suffering a severe recession and areas where conditions were not so
severe. Wilkinson contends, citing Richard Titmuss's argument, that what improved this situation
28 Ibid., pp. 400-403. For the influence of British municipal socialism on Japan, see J.E. Hanes, The City as
Subject: Seki Hajime and the reinvention of modern Osaka (2002)
29 S. Szreter, ‘The importance of social intervention in Britain’s mortality decline c. 1850-1914’, Social History
of Medicine, 1 (1988), reprinted in Szreter, Health and Wealth, Chapter 4.
30 See e.g. J. Innes, ‘The "mixed economy of welfare" in early modern England’, in M.J. Daunton (ed.), Charity,
Self-interest and Welfare in the English Past (1996); J. Lewis, ‘Family provision of health and welfare in the
mixed economy of care in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries’, Social History of Medicine, 8 (1995),
pp.1-16.
31 T. Nagashima, ‘A veteran public health reformer planning for an NHS: Arthur Newsholme and the
discussions on medical provision in interwar Britain’, Keio Economic Studies, 39 (2002), pp.37-55.
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was World War II. Because taxation was made more progressive due to the war and rationing
was introduced, society equalized and people strengthened their social bonds. As a result, the
mortality rate for civilians dropped during the war. He perceives the Beveridge Report (1942),
which served as the blueprint for the post-war welfare state, as something that was debated in
the mindset of wanting to keep up these social bonds and fraternity based on equality and fairness
even after peace was restored.32
Prime Minister Cameron also commends the mindset of the welfare state system
established in the late 1940s. The system was established by Clement Atlee’s Labour
government, but because there were many parts to which the Conservatives of that period also
agreed, Cameron is also likely to accept those parts. However, as stated earlier, Cameron, without
commenting on the decision of the Thatcher government to breach the post-war consensus by
reducing the welfare state budget, criticizes the increases in the welfare budget during the Labour
administrations under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, saying they did not produce results. His
contention is that because a system under centralized state leadership interferes with the
motivation for people in the community to voluntarily help each other, it does not produce
results. It is true that welfare state systems thus far have had a lot of problems, and the defects
of centralization and a bureaucracy-led system, which Cameron especially emphasizes, are
serious problems that should be monitored at all times. However, can we really go so far as to
say that the welfare state has impeded people's voluntary good intentions? 
Matthew Hilton and his colleagues at Birmingham University have offered up
evidence-based criticism of this assertion by the Prime Minister. Looking at trends in voluntary
organizations over the past 60 years, while a decline can be observed in traditional organizations
such as trade unions, political party branches, churches, and women's groups, Hilton's team has
found out that people's participation is increasing in new forms of social movements and NGOs
that serve the public interest. They could not confirm a trend in which the expansion of the
welfare state was weakening civil involvement, and instead, they found many examples in which
welfare state policies triggered voluntary initiatives by citizens. Therefore, they conclude that
the governmental sector and the voluntary sector may be in more of a complementary
relationship than a competitive relationship.33
Jane Lewis, a historian of social policy, points out that since its establishment, the British
welfare state has always been in a cooperative relationship with the voluntary sector. ‘New
Labour’ governments of Blair and Brown made clear their stance of exploring partnerships with
voluntary associations for the purpose of eradicating social exclusion. In that sense, utilization
of community organizations that Cameron speaks of is not, on the surface, an especially new
thing. Lewis has noted that under New Labour, the British government showed interest in the
32 Wilkinson, The Impact of Inequality, p.209.
33 M. Hilton, J. McKay, N. Crowson and Jean-Francois Mouhot, ‘'The Big Society': civic participation and the
state in modern Britain’, History and Policy Papers (online), June 2010.
92
concept of social capital. But she worries about that, as in a discussion paper by the Cabinet
Office in 2002, for example, social capital is often treated as if it is something to be built outside
the governmental sector. What Lewis is concerned about seems to be the absence of "linking"
social capital, to use Szreter’s expression.34
Conclusion
This paper has taken a brief look at studies commenting on the role of "government" in the
formation of "social capital," while contrasting this with Prime Minister Cameron's emphasis
on the exclusive relationship between "government" and "society." Of course, as the head of
government, the Prime Minister is aware of the importance of the government's role as a
promoter of "big society." But if he implements his "big society" idea from the top-down, he
himself is bound to be ensnared in the very centralized means that he views as problematic.
How can the central government evoke "voluntary" activities by local people? The present
government does not seem to be free from the same difficulty that successive governments have
encountered in the past. The plan to establish a Big Society Bank could be a measure devised
for that reason. As a plan for community revitalization, it will be interesting to see how it
develops in the future. But it does not seem that it alone will serve as the deciding factor in
resolving the problem of inequality and related problems.35
In this short essay, I cannot go into a specific discussion of what to do about the size of
"government" – that is, how to define in practice the boundaries between the governmental and
the voluntary sectors (as well as the market sector). But it should be pointed out that whereas
Prime Minister Cameron is emphasizing the competitive relationship between the two sectors
and the need for the latter to substitute for the former, if we look at things from a historical
perspective, it has been observed that the welfare society was more effective when the two
sectors had an active complementary and synergistic relationship. As historian Pat Thane has
pointed out, Cameron’s rhetoric about promoting "big society" seems to be only the latest version
of many terms to describe voluntary community action (like Blair’s "third sector"), but based
on the wrong assumption that Britain’s state welfare has always been antagonistic to non-state
welfare.36
It is not the main purpose of this paper to criticize the British government’s policies but
to think about the scope of social capital studies, by looking at the arguments of several
34 J. Lewis, ‘The state and the third sector in modern welfare states: independence, instrumentality, partnership’,
in A. Evers and J.-L. Laville (eds.), The Third Sector in Europe (2004), pp. 175-176.
35 As for issues relating to the community care of the elderly, for instance, see M. Hayashi, ‘The care of older
people in Japan: myths and realities of family 'care'’, History and Policy Papers (online), June 2011. To provide
policy implications for "big society", this paper, based on a careful historical review of the care of old people
in Japan, points out that neither statutory nor voluntary mutual-help schemes are panaceas, yet both have valuable
roles in alleviating social problems, and actually require more state support.
36 P. Thane, ‘There has always been a "Big Society",’ History Workshop (online), April 30, 2011
93
The Senshu Social Capital Review No.2 (2011)
researchers in comparison with the big society idea. In particular, it has focused on the argument
presented by Szreter, who has found in history how important trust and reciprocal relations
including the governmental sector are for population health, and who has developed the linking
social capital argument. When Szreter takes the 1870s to be the turning point in the shape of
social capital in Britain, he is conscious of its similarity to the transition Putnam describes from
the Gilded Age to the Progressive Era in the United States. The mid-nineteenth century in Britain
and the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the US were both eras of remarkable economic
growth. But at the same time, they were both periods when the problems of unequal societies
became evident, such as poor health among the working classes. Bonding social capital existed
even in these times, but there were many people who were excluded from it. The way Szreter
sees it, the times when movements took place in earnest that were aimed at public health reform
whose benefits would extend to a broader segment of society were the last quarter of the
nineteenth century in Britain and during the Progressive Era in the early twentieth century in
the US. With local governments playing a central role, these movements utilized local voluntary
activities on the one hand while, on the other hand, getting the central government involved. In
other words, the formation of linking social capital had major significance for the improvement
of public health in the latter era. And when he focuses on these turning points in history, his
perception of the issues is to suggest that the age of globalizing economic growth in the late
twentieth century has aspects that resemble the first of the periods mentioned above. He implies
therefore that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the way linking social capital is
formed is important to the resolution of public health problems across the world.37
However, this does not necessarily mean that as long as linking social capital is formed
externally, all is fine. Noting that municipal governments in the Progressive Era were often
breeding grounds for nepotism and political corruption, Kunitz argues that not only bonding
social capital but even bridging and linking social capital are by no means alien to that problem.
He also says that linking social capital does not automatically operate as a positive force for
public health. For example, in the United States during the Progressive Era, the National Civic
Federation composed of business and labour leaders got citizens and the Congress involved and
succeeded in getting a draft for a national health insurance scheme scrapped. The same sort of
crusade against public health insurance was seen during the Clinton administration as well, and
President Obama is coming up against that very problem right now. Essentially, Kunitz is calling
attention to the possibility that linking social capital could operate as both a positive and negative
force for public health, and that basically depending on who it is formed or utilized for, for what
purpose, and to what extent, its influence on and significance for people can vary.38
Also, we should keep in mind that the formation of linking social capital is particularly
37 S. Szreter, ‘Public health and security in an age of globalizing economic growth: the awkward lessons of
history’, in Szreter, Health and Wealth, Chapter 12.
38 Kunitz, The Health of Populations, p. 124.
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39 Lewis, ‘The state and the third sector in modern welfare states’, pp.176-177.
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difficult under autocratic or corrupted regimes. On the other hand, in countries with liberal
democracy, making it work and utilizing it soundly may lead to social capital formation. Lewis,
commenting with European nations in mind, says that to make social capital abundant, it is
important for it to be embedded in and linked to formal political systems.39 In countries adopting
systems of democracy, if we overemphasize the conceptual antagonism between "government"
and "civil society", we could bypass the principle that the government is supposed to be
composed based on representative democracy. In reality, however, governmental authorities
have various difficulties and often the target of mistrust by many people. Yet it is desirable
patiently to seek the way to make governmental agencies really "public" bodies by making
democracy work, and this would be an important step towards "linking social capital" formation. 
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